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Abstract:  India’s story of the last two decades since the country made a transition to a liberal 
economic policy regime has many sides to it that may be considered somewhat remarkable in 
the light of her historical legacy. India has in this period certainly been an important part of 
the story of the ‘rise of the rest’ and appears to be one of the most successful cases of increased 
integration into the global economy despite her less remarkable history of industrialization.  
Instead of losing ground in global competition, Indian big business which till then had grown 
in the sheltered environment provided by protectionism has experienced a growth more rapid 
than in the past and stepped on to the global stage. Two decades of development under 
liberalization, however, has also had a very exclusive character, its narrow social base 
precluding the possibility of any broad social consensus on liberalization. The durability of 
such a process in the background of India’s long and stable history of having a formal political 
structure of representative democracy based on universal adult suffrage is then another of its 
remarkable features. This paper tries to explain how these phenomena that may appear 
surprising at first sight, are mutually interrelated and linked up with the process of 
liberalization itself.    
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Whether it is a process of capitalist industrialization and expansion in a Third World country, 
or its larger economic and social transformation called „development‟, the importance of the 
role played by the state in shaping the outcomes is always crucial. This includes the degree of 
success it achieves in reconciling the two processes that are not automatically coincident, more 
so in an economy with a large non-capitalist segment. At first sight India‟s economic trajectory 
over the last two decades would appear to be one where great success has been achieved on the 
economic expansion front, making India one of the prominent examples of the „rise of the rest‟ 
(Amsden 2001). Whether this has happened because of or despite the Indian state may be less 
clear given that the background to it has been a process of economic liberalization and a 
redefining of the relationship between the state and private capital in the economic realm. There 
can, however, be little doubt that there are other dimensions of that trajectory which certainly 
reflect persistence, and maybe even reinforcement, of barriers to India‟s escape from the 
underdevelopment trap.  
The totality of India‟s liberalization story – encompassing its origins and sustenance as well as 
its consequences – has an enigmatic character to it. Some parts of that story can easily be 
causally related to others but these explanatory factors themselves often elude simple 
explanations. How did a country which was amongst the poorest in the world and had one of 
the less remarkable industrialization experiences of the second half of the twentieth century 
make the transition to greater integration with the global economy and make it „successfully‟?  
Why has this „emergence‟ expressed itself mainly in terms of aggregate economic performance 
and the positive fortunes of Indian business firms but bypassed the vast majority? How has this 
increasing divergence between economic growth and development been consistent with the 
maintenance of India‟s democratic political system? How long can this kind of a trajectory with 
two rather different sides to it sustain itself both economically as well as politically? This paper 
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does not provide the comprehensive analysis of the Indian experience of the last two decades 
that must be the basis for answering such questions. It does, however, highlight some of the 
important economic forces that have been at work within and outside the purely economic 
sphere in shaping the multi-faceted story of India‟s „emergence‟.  
The paper argues that the developmental „failure‟ of the Indian state in the last two decades has 
been endogenously determined – it is a joint-product of that very same liberalization which 
created the conditions for the specific kind of rapid expansion witnessed. The state has been 
central to the „success‟ achieved by private capital but only by rendering itself less capable of 
responding to the requirements of the more fundamental transformation of the conditions of the 
majority of India‟s citizens. In the absence of such a transformation, there are questions about 
the sustainability of the expansion process. There are economic as well as political barriers 
which have expressed themselves in some manner or the other from time to time. If the former 
has not so far seriously compromised the aggregative expansion it is only because of the rather 
distinctive pattern of Indian growth. The dissatisfaction that does exist to the course taken by 
the Indian state, on the other hand, has not been able to so far crystallize into a political 
resistance of the proportions necessary to compel any change. Such crystallization in fact is a 
less spontaneous product of the context which is impelling the state to move in a particular 
direction. Its emergence is not guaranteed simply by the existence of a political structure where 
governments have to be elected. When and to what extent India‟s current economic trajectory 
will confront its political limits is therefore harder to predict. 
The first part of the paper expands on theme of puzzles associated with India‟s liberalization 
story. The next part then briefly reviews the impact of the pre-liberalization economic strategy 
and the setting up the conditions for the transition to liberalization. This is followed by a 
description of the economic growth story of the last two decades and how its different elements 
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mutually relate to each other. The fourth part then focuses on examining how the redefining of 
the economic role of the state has affected the state itself and altered the state-society 
relationship in a definite direction. At the end, a short conclusion sums up the argument. 
Indian Liberalization and its Puzzles 
Marking the transition to a new stage in India‟s economic history was the shift in state 
economic policy initiated in 1991. The strategy of relatively autonomous development with the 
state playing a leading role as producer and regulator, which was adopted after independence 
and remained broadly in place for over four decades, was decisively abandoned. Increased 
integration with the global economy, greater dependence on the spontaneous tendencies of the 
market system and the primacy of private capital were the defining features of the new strategy. 
Some liberalization measures had of course been introduced earlier, in the 1980s. To that extent 
there was an element of continuity between that decade and the period after 1991. Yet the 
1980s liberalization did not represent that fundamental a departure from the past strategy of 
capitalist development. It was accompanied by a fairly rapid expansion of public expenditure 
and its external sector liberalization process was mainly concentrated on facilitating capital 
goods imports to produce manufactured products for a protected domestic market. Thus, while 
the 1980s may have reflected as well as reinforced a process of the changing mindset of 
policymakers, the decisive break with the past was only made in the subsequent decade. 
The immediate trigger to the 1991 liberalization episode was a foreign exchange crisis which 
forced India to turn to the IMF for assistance. This was not however the first such crisis, and 
nor was it the first one where external pressure was brought to bear on the Indian State to 
influence its economic policies. But the response of the State in 1991 was unlike that in any 
previous case, initiating a long-term policy shift that continued even after the immediate crisis 
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had passed. A similar episode of liberalization in the mid-1960s had been followed by a quick 
and rapid retreat into one of the most restrictive phases of trade and foreign investment policy 
and a wave of nationalization. In the 1980s too, the Indian state took advantage of a recovery 
of the foreign exchange situation and managed to eventually implement an economic policy 
package which fell far short of the terms attached to the 1981 IMF loan (Ghosh 1999).  The 
changes after 1991 have, however, proved to be durable. Economic policy since then has 
moved essentially only in one direction, even long after the immediate crisis passed. More 
deep-seated and long-term changes in the Indian context, and not just a temporary crisis, must 
therefore explain it. 
The advent of the liberal economic policy regime in India was also not preceded by any 
dramatic political change to which the shift could be linked. The announcement of the move of 
course came soon after a new government was formed after the 1991 general elections. The 
elections, however, brought back to power after a brief interlude of just two years the political 
party which had dominated Indian politics since the country‟s independence. Thus the very 
same Indian National Congress which had been at the helm of affairs when India‟s post-
independence dirigiste strategy was put in place also led the initial march towards liberalization 
some four decades later.  
Notwithstanding the fact that the 1991 elections ended what was till then only the second spell 
of India having a non-Congress Government, the Indian political landscape that formed its 
backdrop can hardly be described as unchanging. Already visible were many of the overlapping 
or mutually related trends that have contributed to making the present and the past of Indian 
politics appear so different. These include the shrinking of the Congress‟ stable support base, 
the rise of right-wing Hindu nationalism, the increasing prominence of regional political forces 
and the emergence of new political formations built around core support bases in traditionally 
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oppressed social groups (castes). Indeed, it was not the wave of economic liberalization that 
was to follow virtually immediately after that occupied centre-stage in the 1991 elections. 
Instead, implementation of the recommendations of the Mandal Commission (caste-based 
reservation or affirmative action) by the previous government and the Ram Janambhoomi-
Babri Masjid (Temple vs. Mosque) dispute, and then the assassination of the former Prime 
Minister mid-way through the elections, dominated the election related discourse.  
Even if at a fundamental level the underlying forces behind the changes in Indian politics and 
those in the realm of economic policy are the same, no obvious connection can be seen between 
the two. Instead, one has to confront the intriguing fact that the progress of Indian liberalization 
has remained largely immune to the many changes in government witnessed over the last two 
decades and the changing balance between contending political forces and realignments of 
political alliances associated with these governmental changes. An individual policy here and 
there may have faced problems but parties across the Indian political spectrum, with the 
exception of the Indian Left, have exhibit no tendency to fundamentally challenge the 
liberalization paradigm.  
It would be, however, very difficult to argue that the effective near unanimity across Indian 
political parties on liberalization is a reflection of the emergence of a new social consensus 
displacing the one that had existed earlier. India‟s post-independence development strategy had 
been shaped in the background of her national movement. The struggle to end colonial rule had 
served to politicise a range of social classes which had potentially conflicting interests and one 
of its important outcomes was the creation of a formal political structure based on universal 
suffrage. A consensus on the necessity of maintaining a relative autonomy from the 
international economy and the importance of the role of the state had evolved alongside, even if 
there were differences when it came to the details (Patnaik 1999). Even the rising class of 
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Indian businessmen had played an active part in the formation of this consensus view as they 
saw these as critical requirements for accelerating India‟s industrial development (Tripathi 
1991, Ray 1985, Srinivasan 2002). No comparable political process lay behind the paradigm 
shift in 1991. A range of discontents did exist in Indian society with the results of the earlier 
strategy but there was no coalescing of these into a shared interest in liberalization. The 
changeover instead was as sudden as it was far reaching. It was a top-down process with actors 
within the Indian policy making elite and in international financial institutions initially crafting 
the policy shift (Sengupta 2008).  
If there were any segments of Indian society which came to actively endorse liberalization once 
it had been initiated, it was Indian business and some part of the middle class. This should be 
considered important in explaining the durability of the liberalization process given that the 
social influence of these two groups far exceeds their numerical proportion in Indian society.  
Of these, the change in the attitude of Indian business towards the question of integration with 
the global economy, from what it had been at independence, is a little harder to explain. 
Whatever initial misgivings some of them may have had at the beginning, Indian big business 
came to eventually actively push the „reform‟ agenda (Pedersen 2007, Kohli 2009b). The 
constituents of Indian big business at the time of liberalization were not identical with those 
who had been dominant at independence. They were, however, not entirely different either. A 
mix of old business groups that had successfully survived and newer ones who had risen to 
prominence later made up Indian big business at the time liberalization began (Mazumdar 
2011). All of them, the new and the old, had grown in a sheltered environment provided by 
protectionism and built businesses that were mainly „national‟ – investing, producing, selling 
and raising finances mainly within that domain. They had great experience in manoeuvring 
within and through the system of controls associated with Indian dirigisme but had developed 
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little capacity for self-development of technology (Alam 1985, Tyabji 2000). Why they should 
have welcomed a greater exposure to global competition is therefore not self-evident. Nor is it 
quite so simple to explain the great success that corporate India has experienced over the last 
two decades, which of course has contributed to reinforcing their endorsement of liberalization. 
Instead of being swamped by global competition, Indian business has grown in this period 
more rapidly than in the past and acquired a more international character.  
An important part of corporate expansion is due to its overwhelming domination of the Indian 
growth story of this period. With liberalization the Indian economy did not experience a severe 
contraction of the kind Latin America and Africa had in the „lost decade‟ of the 1980s. Instead 
it initially sustained the levels of aggregate growth attained in the 1980s, when India started 
growing faster than in the previous three decades and also faster than the world economy. This 
was followed by a shift to a phase from 2003-04 onwards when growth rates climbed to heights 
unprecedented in India‟s history, accompanied by a sharp rise in the investment and savings 
ratios. Even the slowdown after the global crisis has been associated with growth rates higher 
than had been the norm in the 1980s and 1990s, though the investment ratio‟s rise has been 
arrested. Thus there has been a significant increase in India‟s share in global production. It has 
consequently overtaken many developed as well developing countries that three decades ago 
were considerably larger in economic size than India. This and the appearance of Indian firms 
on the international stage are the two clear signs of India‟s „emergence‟. Yet why India, without 
a history of having built an internationally competitive industrial structure and similarly 
competitive firms should have become one of the fastest growing countries under globalization, 
besting on this front most of her Asian and Latin American Third World counterparts excepting 
China, has never been clearly explained?  
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It bears keeping in mind also that despite a near tripling of her per capita income levels over the 
last two decades, India on this count still is way behind even many developing countries. This 
acquires added significance in view of the very exclusive nature of the rising trend in income, 
which has virtually completely bypassed the overwhelming majority of India‟s populace 
(Sengupta, Kannan and Raveendran, 2008, Vakulabharanam 2010) such that even food 
consumption levels have fallen for large segments of the population from the already low levels 
of the pre-liberalization days. Sharply rising inequality, and that too one accompanied by 
stagnation of their incomes, has meant that this majority has had no basis for actively 
supporting liberalization. Widespread discontent amongst them has instead existed and found 
expression in increased political instability. This has, however, failed to shift the centre of 
gravity of economic policy making and to that extent the democratic political system has not 
proved to be a check on a highly inegalitarian growth process. In the background of the disaster 
of the „India Shining‟ campaign in 20041, the relatively favourable revenue situation created by 
very high growth, and a government dependent on the support of the Left, India‟s poor did 
receive some limited attention compared to the complete neglect of the previous decade and a 
half. Measures like the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGA) were 
introduced during this period but within the framework of the existing policy paradigm. Even 
such modest efforts at redressing the worst effects of India‟s growth trajectory, however, have 
run into difficulties as the fiscal situation has deteriorated after the global crisis.    
                                                 
1
 This was an advertising campaign run by then incumbent BJP-led National Democratic Alliance Government 
in the run up to the general elections. It backfired because it projected an image of India that was in sharp 
contrast to the lived reality of a large number of Indians.  
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The Pre-history of Liberalization: The State, Industrialization and 
Transformation after Independence  
The formal governing structure of the Indian republic was put in place soon after the country‟s 
independence from British rule. Its key elements were a federal system of government with 
cabinets and elected legislatures at the central and state level, with a division of powers 
between them. This was followed by the linguistic reorganization of states. The constitutional 
framework of Government that came into being had its antecedents in the „constitutional 
reforms‟ brought about by the erstwhile British rulers. The constitution of independent India 
however severed the direct political ties with Britain, and eliminated the many special powers 
that had been exercised by the non-elected bureaucracy. It extended the electorate to include the 
entire adult population, and replaced the system of representation by „classes and interests‟ with 
one of territorial representation. The administrative apparatus of Government, the police force 
and the army of independent India were inherited from British rule as they were (Bettelheim 
1977).  
The strategy of „planned economic development‟ was also put into practice from the 1950s. 
State economic policy was to be subsequently marked by periodic changes as a result of 
frequent adjustments in response to, or forced by, contingent circumstances. The heydays of 
planning were consequently effectively restricted to the decade of the Second and Third Five-
year plans. Through all those changes, however, the two core elements of the strategy were 
maintained. The state remained interventionist in nature and the formal structure of planning 
often continued to be the mechanism of that intervention. At the same time relative autonomy 
was maintained through controls on flows of capital, goods and technologies though they were 
never completely stopped.  
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The record of the pre-liberalization strategy in promoting Indian industrialization and 
development was certainly not spectacular. The pace of industrial growth was greater than in 
the colonial era (Sivasubramonian 2000) and in itself a fairly large and diversified industrial 
sector came into being. However, industrial growth was unstable and the increases in per 
capita levels of industrial production and the industrial sector‟s share in aggregate output 
remained within limits. Industrial expansion was mainly domestic market based - 
manufactured exports remained very limited and were also dominated by low-tech labour-
intensive products. Structural changes in employment lagged even further behind that in 
output. The major part of the workforce remained in agriculture and formal employment 
expanded to cover barely ten per cent of the workforce. This formal employment expanded 
more in the public than in the private sector and this formed the core basis for an expansion 
of the middle class. State intervention in agriculture also benefitted a stratum within the 
agricultural population including the upper segments of the peasantry. Yet widespread 
poverty remained prevalent. All in all, the larger transformative impact of India‟s 
industrialization was of a much lower order than those that occurred in some other Asian 
developing countries over the same time.     
What however tends to get somewhat obscured in the larger story of Indian development, 
particularly because it expressed itself more clearly only later, is the following. Import-
substituting industrialization did provide a background for a significant development of 
Indian big business whose original background was in mercantile activities (Mazumdar 
2008a). The transformation of Indian capital from where it had been at independence went 
much further than the overall progress of Indian industrialization might suggest. Private 
corporate capital‟s relative share in the economy did not increase significantly except in the 
initial years of the period. It also became more confined to manufacturing activities as it was 
The State, Capital and Development in „Emerging‟ India 12 
 
squeezed out by the public sector from other spheres like banking and finance, mining, 
transport and communication, electricity, etc. As the manufacturing sector became more 
diversified, however, Indian business groups moved from a situation of being confined to a 
few traditional industries like the textiles into others such as steel and steel products, 
chemicals, cement, automobiles and automobile products, industrial and other machinery and 
consumer electronics. This expansion in newer and more „modern‟ industries increased the 
level of technological sophistication that Indian big business firms dealt with. They learnt to 
find, absorb, adapt, and profitably use technologies and technological advances across the 
industrial spectrum even if they themselves did not develop them. In other words Indian 
private capital did experience a process of „learning-by-doing‟, and one that had a somewhat 
unique character given the constraints within which it happened.  
Compared to the position existing at independence, this learning did not eliminate but closed 
the gap between Indian business firms and the top rung of firms internationally. This was to 
prove to be important for facing the challenges that liberalization was to throw up – it made 
Indian business firms capable of facing global competition particularly in the environment 
with which they had a special familiarity, namely the Indian domestic market and economic 
space. If this made them more willing to accept such competition, the continuing weakness 
on the technological front also pushed them in the same direction (Mazumdar 2008a). As the 
scope for industrial growth through diversification and a successive diffusion of industries 
exhausted its own scope, the technological requirements of capitalist expansion changed. 
Opening up was necessary for Indian capital to get the kind of access to technology its new 
stage of development required, and facing the competition this would expose them to in turn 
required an unshackling of the controls they had been subjected too. Thus the conditions for 
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the eventual switchover of Indian capital to the endorsement of liberalization were created 
through the process of import-substituting industrialization. 
In shaping the story of Indian industrialization and development before liberalization, both 
what the state did as well as its failures were important. In explaining the relatively limited 
overall success of Indian dirigisme, two major failures of the Indian state stand out. Both 
reflected the limits to its ability to impose itself on powerful economic interests. The first of 
these was the limited success achieved in carrying out the agrarian reform programme after 
independence (Joshi 1975) to eliminate what was called the „built-in-depressor‟ (Thorner 
1956).  If dominant landed interests thwarted the institutional change in agriculture that was 
necessary for an accelerated process of industrialization, Indian big business managed to also 
escape disciplining by the state (Chibber 2004). What has been pejoratively called the “license-
permit raj” was in reality the routine abuse, manipulation, and circumvention of the system of 
controls to their advantage by big business firms with the assistance of the discretionary 
decision-makers in the state apparatus. This became thus an entrenched part of business 
behaviour and the clientelism, corruption and cronyism associated with it became more 
pronounced with time (Goyal 1979, Kochanek 1987, Virmani 2004). Private capital also 
successfully beat the revenue mobilization effort thereby limiting the state‟s ability to expand 
public expenditures. As a result of these, the extent and the effectiveness of the state support 
to industrialization and social development were undermined and were later to be used to 
make the case for the withdrawal of the state. 
It would, however, be a bit of a caricature to represent the Indian state before liberalization as 
being entirely captive to powerful private interests. Indeed it was not even the case that a fixed 
and exclusive set of favoured business firms remained the beneficiaries of state patronage 
throughout. This is what created the possibility for new constituents in India‟s business elite 
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to emerge. The state‟s general promotional role in enabling the industrialization process, 
which expressed itself through a rising share of the public sector in total output, was also 
critical. This provided the backdrop for diverse firm histories - of decline, survival and of 
rise. The development of the financial system to support private capitalist accumulation and 
the backward and forward linkages of public investment for instance were extremely 
important. Notwithstanding the shortcomings of Indian land reforms, the extensive 
involvement of the state in other ways in the agrarian economy was also crucial (Patnaik 
1994, Rao 1994). Even if success on the agrarian front was not spectacular, it was critical. 
The overarching setting of an interventionist economic policy regime also provided a context 
for significant autonomous state action. For instance, the period of the most intense economic 
difficulties, from the mid-1960s to the late 1970s, also saw the high tide of nationalization and 
government takeovers of many stricken private sector companies. While it may not be correct 
to suggest that these were exclusively responsible, the political pressures emanating from the 
aspirations of diverse segments of Indian society did influence the nature of these measures. In 
addition, while resource constraints may have limited their actual magnitude – the idea that the 
state had to deliver a range of benefits to all citizens, pejoratively described by some as 
„economic populism‟, was part of the dominant political discourse. At the same time, the milieu 
made for institutions like the judiciary and some public agencies to develop a particular 
instinctive attitude that at least partly ameliorated inherent iniquities, including in the area of 
labour regulation.  
Iniquitous development was therefore written into the script of Indian dirigisme and did give 
rise to significant social and political conflict. Authoritarian tendencies also emerged but the 
political system survived by also checking them. The political structure nevertheless served 
more as a pressure valve rather than as an effective antidote to the iniquities inherent in the 
The State, Capital and Development in „Emerging‟ India 15 
 
economic and social structure. In doing so, however, it did moderate the effects of these 
iniquities. 
 Growth and Divergence after Liberalization 
The private corporate sector has grown considerably faster than the rest of the economy in the 
last two decades, and enlarged its share in India‟s national product from under 15 per cent to 
nearly a quarter over this period. The gap between its pace of expansion and that of the rest of 
the economy has also tended to be greater in periods of higher growth. This is an important 
difference between the pre- and post-liberalization periods. An important significance of this 
lies in the fact that even after two decades of such growth, formal employment in the private 
sector in India is under 11 million, up from about 7.68 million in 1991, when the estimated size 
of the labour force is about 450 million and over 750 million are in the working age group. 
Even this growth of private sector employment has happened alongside a parallel shrinking of 
public sector employment from over 19 million to less than 18 million. In other words, formal 
employment, always a very small proportion of employment in India, has stagnated in absolute 
terms and its relative share in total employment has shrunk. There has of course been additional 
expansion of employment in the private formal sector of an „informal‟ kind – irregular and 
casual and lacking the work benefits typically associated with formal employment 
(Government of India, NCEUS 2007). Even taking this into account, it is quite clear that the 
rapid growth of the corporate sector has made no significant dent in the Indian employment 
situation.  
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The other side of the story of Indian growth relates to the sector which has been and still 
remains the principal sector of employment
2
, namely the agricultural sector. Here, the 
withdrawal of the state and other measures associated with liberal economic policies gave rise 
to a deep-rooted agrarian crisis since the 1990s (Patnaik 2003, 2007, Reddy and Mishra 2008). 
Over 200,000 suicides by farmers since then was only one symptom. Some pockets of 
dynamism apart, the agrarian crisis has had a generally adverse effect on livelihoods. Distress 
driven exit from the sector on the other hand could not be absorbed by the rapidly growing 
private corporate sector with the result that non-agricultural informal employment has swelled.  
Moreover, this has happened in a situation where the agrarian situation has held down the 
reservation wage in non-agricultural activities. 
The wage-depressing tendencies in India have been so strong that real wages have been flat or 
creeping downwards even in the private formal sector despite the sector‟s rapid growth (Figure 
1). In the industrial sector, this has been aided and enabled by the increasing informalization of 
formal sector employment and the attitudinal changes liberalization has brought to the working 
of public agencies and the judiciary (Bhattacharya 2007, Papola and Sharma 2004, Roy 
Chowdhury 2005).  Thus, despite the legal framework of labour regulation having remained 
relatively unchanged there has been a movement towards increasingly flexible labour markets, 
erosion of collective bargaining and the greater role of capital in setting the terms of work. 
These have created the conditions for wages in the formal sector to reflect more clearly the 
general labour-market situation making their trend an indicator of what has happened to 
income-levels of large segments of India‟s population in the last two decades. Given that India 
is still an extremely poor country, the trend of income stagnation and depression over large 
                                                 
2
 In 2009-10, 53 per cent of the labour-force was in agriculture while the rural labour-force share in the total was 
over 71 per cent. 
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segments of its population is a particularly striking phenomenon. That food consumption trends 
also reflect these is testimony to the grim situation.  
Figure 1: Index of Real-Wage per Worker in India’s Organized Industrial Sector (2002-
03=100) 
 
Source: Central Statistical Organization (CSO), Annual Survey of Industries and Government of India, Ministry of 
Finance, Economic Survey 
Thus the effect of Indian liberalization has been to impart to the economy a structural feature 
whereby the overwhelming part of the workforce is caught in a permanent low-wage or low-
income trap. With public expenditure also being constrained by the logic of liberalization, these 
conditions cannot be easily changed either. 
The low levels of wages have also served to provide enabling conditions for a very different 
trend in the salaries of white collar employees in the private corporate sector with higher levels 
of education. For one, combining with the limited growth of employment they have ensured 
that these high salaries of a section of employees does not overinflate the wage and salary bills 
of corporate firms. Indeed, the distribution of income within the private formal sector during 
this period has shifted decisively in favour of surplus incomes (Table 1). Even as the share of 
Series1, 1990-91 , 
108.41 
Series1, 1995-96 , 
117.12 
Series1, 2009-10 , 
99.78 
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the corporate sector in total national income has grown sharply, that of one of its components, 
namely compensation of employees, has actually declined. Low wages have also effectively 
raised the real incomes of those with higher salaries because they result in the cheap availability 
of a range of labour-intensive services. Insofar as many of these are non-tradable services they 
have also contributed to keeping the exchange rate lower than what purchasing power parity 
would dictate. All of these in turn have meant that the cost of production of labour-intensive 
tradable services also tends to be low in India, even when they involve large high salary 
employment as in India‟s software sector.      
Table 1: Shares of the Private Organized Sector Output and its Components in India’s 
Aggregate Net Domestic Product (NDP) (Percentages) 
Component 1999-00 Base Year Series 
  1990-91  1996-97  2002-03  2003-04  2004-05  2007-08  
Compensation of Employees 7.72 6.01 6.61 6.69 6.46 6.82 
Operating Surplus 6.35 11.44 11.96 12.56 14.08 16.62 
Total Private Organized NDP 14.07 17.45 18.56 19.26 20.54 23.44 
  2004-05 Base Year Series 
  2004-05 2005-06  2006-07  2007-08  2008-09  2009-10 
Compensation of Employees 6.35 6.48 5.93 5.80 5.70 5.55 
Operating Surplus 13.21 15.55 17.24 17.85 17.27 16.78 
Total Private Organized NDP 19.55 22.04 23.16 23.65 22.97 22.32 
Source: Central Statistical Organization, National Accounts Statistics 
Rapid growth of the corporate sector and corporate profits has thus remained consistent with a 
rising trend in salaries of sections of the employees of the sector. In response, public sector 
salaries have also eventually gone up and more so at the higher end of the salary range. 
Between the two, and also because of their becoming part of a geographically mobile global 
work-force, there has been a considerable enrichment of an upper crust in India‟s middle class. 
The expansion and widening of that segment, which had happened to an extent earlier, has, 
however, almost completely ceased.  
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Such sharp differences in the income trends of different segments of employees are of course 
symptomatic of a larger story of increasing inequality. These income distribution trends have 
also reinforced the narrowness of the Indian domestic market with greatly different effects on 
the demand for industrial products and for services. The holding down of incomes of a large 
majority of the population has continued to keep them out of the market for manufactured 
goods. At the other, rising incomes of those already in the market has resulted in further 
diversification of their demand, increasingly in favour of services. This has meant that the 
aggregate consumption demand pattern has been shifting in favour of services. 
Even with low wages, Indian manufacturing has not found too many niches in the 
internationalized system of production characteristic of the globalization era where it is 
competitive. Lack of public investment in health, education and infrastructure has been the 
problem here, contributing to keeping productivity low relative to other competing nations. On 
the other hand, wages are already very low and account for a very small proportion of industrial 
costs
3
. The scope for gaining competitiveness by wage depression therefore practically does not 
exist.  Thus, even while manufactured exports have grown and there has been some change in 
their composition, manufactured imports have tended to grow even faster. India‟s trade deficit 
has consequently become very large, with oil and gold imports adding their bit too. Indian 
industry therefore continues to be mainly domestic market oriented and India has not been a 
major recipient of the world market oriented „efficiency-seeking‟ FDI. India‟s greatest export 
success after liberalization has been in services and that too in a very specific category of 
                                                 
3
 The share of wages in the value added of India‟s formal industrial sector is barely 10 per cent and as a 
proportion of the value of output they are under two per cent.  
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information technology (IT) and IT-enabled services
4
. A significant surplus in services trade 
has been complemented by large inflows of remittances to partly compensate for the expanding 
trade deficit.  
Not surprisingly, Indian growth since liberalization has been driven more than ever before by 
expansion of tradable and non-tradable services and construction activities rather than by that 
of tradable manufactured products.  In the absence of significant domestic and external market 
growth, industrial growth in India has become excessively dependent on demand generated by 
investment. This, under liberalization conditions has meant private corporate investment, which 
has a strong tendency to be concentrated in manufacturing. This, however, has made for great 
instability in that investment and also industrial growth (Mazumdar 2008b). This has 
completely stalled India‟s industrialization process and the share of industry in total output has 
stagnated since the mid-1990s at levels far below those historically achieved by successful 
early or late industrializers (Mazumdar 2010). It is only the steady growth of services and their 
rising weight in total output that has prevented aggregate growth trends from fully reflecting 
the instability that has afflicted both agricultural as well as industrial growth. 
The corporate sector‟s unprecedented expansion under liberalization has happened despite the 
constraints on industrialization because business firms have found profitable opportunities in 
the fast-growing services and of late also in construction. Rising incomes at the top as well as 
the transmission of speculative sentiments from the global economy via inflows of capital 
contributed to a sharp upturn in the growth of the construction sector.  Services and 
construction have thus displaced manufacturing as the principal spheres of private corporate 
                                                 
4
 Apart from India‟s low-wage economy, underlying the export success in IT has been has been the long-
standing existence of an English-language based tertiary education sector, a legacy of both her colonial and 
dirigiste pasts. 
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activity. In a sense, therefore, the corporate sector in India has grown by de-industrializing 
itself (Table 2). 
Table 2: Share of Private Organized NDP from different sectors in India’s NDP 
Sector 1990-91 1996-97 2002-03 2007-08 
1999-00 Base Year Series 
Agriculture 2.21 2.18 1.39 1.21 
Industry excl. Construction 6.44 8.03 6.83 7.39 
Services and Construction 5.62 7.33 10.35 14.84 
Total Private Organized 14.26 17.55 18.56 23.44 
2004-05 Base Year Series 
 2004-05 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10 
Agriculture 0.56 0.46 0.46 0.44 
Industry excl. Construction 6.10 6.97 6.90 6.52 
Services and Construction 12.90 16.22 15.61 15.36 
Total Private Organized 19.55 23.65 22.97 22.32 
Source: CSO, National Accounts Statistics 
Indian business groups have clearly been the principal beneficiaries of rapid corporate growth. 
Capital inflows into India did of course increase significantly after 1991. These have been, 
however, dominated by portfolio flows with even a significant component of direct investment 
being of a similar „financial‟ nature (Chalapati Rao and Dhar 2011). Such flows, and the 
openness of the economy to them, have increased the range of financing options available to 
Indian firms rather than being competitive in nature. Foreign investment by Indian firms has 
also been facilitated by these inflows supplying the necessary foreign exchange. While the 
presence in India of foreign firms through foreign direct investment has become more 
pronounced after liberalization, it remains narrow in spread.  
Indian big business thus has been able to find ample space for its own growth and development 
in the process of India‟s integration into the global economy. Partly this reflects the strengths it 
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had acquired in the earlier stage of industrialization. There is, however, little evidence to 
suggest that barring the pharmaceutical industry, there has been any significant increase in the 
innovative capacity of the Indian private sector (Mani 2009). Even in pharmaceuticals, Indian 
firms lack drug development capabilities (Chaudhuri 2008, Jha 2007). In the other highly 
internationalized sector, software, innovative activity in India has been mainly by foreign R & 
D units (Mani 2009) and Indian firms have found their niche in a relatively subordinate position 
to the internationally dominant firms in the sector (D‟Costa 2004). In other words, Indian firms 
still rely primarily on their experience in sourcing and using technology rather than making it. 
This probably explains their relatively minor presence in sectors where proprietary technology 
is a critical element in competitive strength (like automobiles). The pattern of Indian growth 
has therefore been to their advantage. In a number of services and construction activities, the 
role of self-development of technology in any case tends to be limited, but other assets like 
familiarity with local conditions and networks are critical because of their non-tradability. Even 
the pattern of internationalization of Indian firms, dominated as it has been by acquisitions, has 
been explained as being more a process of acquiring competitive strengths like innovative 
capacity rather than their result (Nayyar 2008). There is, however, an additional element in the 
success of Indian big business – the support of the state.      
 ‘Retreat’ and ‘Capture’: The Indian State Under Liberalization 
The transition to liberalization at one end was marked by a „retreat of the state‟ insofar as both 
actual economic policy and its rationalizing ideology were oriented towards withdrawing the 
state from many of the direct roles it had been expected to perform in the past. This, however, 
itself required the state to assume a new role – that of overseeing that process of retreat and 
opening up of the economy, shaping their extent and speed, facilitating private sector entry and 
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operation in the spheres from which it was withdrawing, etc. Thus the „retreat‟ of the state was 
a necessarily qualified one. The very nature of the process – involving as it did privatization of 
public enterprises, setting the rules of private entry into a slew of sectors lacking competitive 
markets which were earlier dominated by the public sector (telecommunications, power, 
mining, petroleum and gas, banking, insurance, airlines, etc) and then creating the mechanisms 
for regulating them – made it amenable to manipulation by private interests just as the old 
control regime was. The difference was that liberalization, by opening up vast spheres of profit-
making to private capital strengthened the incentive for such manipulation. The recourse to 
public-private partnerships in the development of infrastructure and a partly speculation driven 
expansion of the real estate sector have further reinforced this. It is not surprising therefore that 
instead of the development of arms-length relationships between the state and private capital, 
liberalization has given rise to corruption, cronyism and clientelism on an even larger scale.  
In a deeper structural manner, the retreat of the state has also increased the leverage of private 
corporate capital alongside that of financial markets. Along with opening up of the economy 
have come inherent fiscal restrictions on the state. Constrained in its ability to drive the 
economy‟s growth process through public investment, the state has to induce the private sector 
to play that role. Policy has therefore had to be oriented towards encouraging private 
investment and that too in a context of global competition. This has had a feedback loop 
reinforcing itself – tax concessions rather than public expenditure have become the mechanism 
of inducing private investment while revenues have become dependent on the levels of 
corporate profits since rates cannot be raised. The placing of the private sector in such a 
privileged position has in turn made the adoption of a friendly attitude towards it a part of the 
general culture of state functioning in India. In a federal set-up like India‟s, the degree of this 
has been enhanced by the competition for investment between states that liberalization has 
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forced them into. At the same time large business firms which have established themselves in 
key sectors have increased their clout and thus influence on regulatory policy in them. 
Moreover, in a globalized context, private business enterprises have also become the standard-
bearers of “nationalism”, “national-interest”, and “national achievement” so that national 
success tends to be seen as something that coincides with their success.  
The status enjoyed by corporate capital in India and its voice and influence over policy making 
process, have perhaps never been greater than has been the case under liberalization. Granting 
„concessions‟ and providing „incentives‟ to private capital, and using the state‟s power to 
facilitate private capitalist expansion (as in the case of land acquisition for private industrial, 
infrastructural, and real estate projects), have become second nature to the Indian state. The 
state‟s ability to discipline private capital has been further eroded and a permissive attitude 
towards capitalist lawlessness has also been a perceptible feature of this period. The retreat of 
the state has thus meant effectively a greater degree of state capture by sectional interests, in a 
structural sense as well as in the sense of a few well connected business groups commanding 
tremendous individual influence.  
One side of the state-capital relationship under liberalization has been its role in facilitating the 
success of Indian capital in the face of global competition. The gradual and calibrated nature of 
Indian liberalization has contributed to this and facilitated the adaptation and adjustment of 
Indian big business to the new competitive context. It has also helped them set themselves up in 
many of the new sectors opened up for private capital in which they had no previous 
experience. The state also took countervailing measures when there was any significant threat 
The State, Capital and Development in „Emerging‟ India 25 
 
to Indian business from foreign capital
5
. More explicit state support has helped sectors like the 
export-oriented IT sector break into and maintain their position in global markets
6
 (D‟Costa 
2009).   
Individually as well as collectively, Indian private capitalist firms have therefore not scripted 
their success in the last two decades without the generous helping hand of the state. The 
stranglehold of capital over the state has, however, meant tilting it against the interests of other 
segments of Indian society who have found it far more difficult to claim the state‟s attention. 
Under the mutually reinforcing pressures of globalization, fiscal constraints and the growing 
clout of Indian big business, the capacity of the state to respond to the conditions of these 
sections except through the further promotion of private capital has been considerably 
circumscribed. Every phase of upturn in the aggregative economic performance generates a 
reluctance to do anything that might adversely affect the „animal spirits‟ and the „state of 
confidence‟ of the private investor. Every downturn generates a tendency for measures to 
revive these. This state of effective blindness of the state, reflected by political parties to an 
even greater extent when in government, has also been reinforced by the middle class 
endorsement of liberalization. The middle class is of course automatically a social group with a 
naturally strong presence in the administration, the media as well as in academia. The Indian 
middle class under current conditions is also becoming more exclusive since it is largely 
                                                 
5
 One prominent example of this is the creation and then the subsequent virtual killing of the „market for 
corporate control‟. This was achieved by the easing of restrictions on inter-corporate investments in response to 
lobbying by Indian business groups so that these groups could increase their stakes in companies controlled by 
them. 
6
 Apart from the state sponsoring the development of software technology parks from 1991, the software sector 
has also been the greatest beneficiary of fiscal incentives like an extended tax holiday. The state has also 
politically supported the sector‟s efforts to gain and maintain international market access, including in the 
recurrent controversy over outsourcing. The critical need of the IT sector of a skilled workforce has been met to 
a great extent by public tertiary education institutions, many of them a legacy of the past. 
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reproducing itself rather than being expanded by increased penetration by upwardly mobile 
sections of other social groups.  
Thus, the trajectory that the Indian economy has traversed over the last two decades has 
carried within it an underlying basis for not only the increasing divergence witnessed but 
also its persistence working through the erosion of the state‟s capacity to respond to it. The 
following statement made nearly a decade and a half ago was perhaps made by observing 
the early signs of this tendency. 
“It is, then, plausible to suggest that this latest phase of independent India is characterized 
by an intensification of conflict in the economy, in the polity, and in the interaction 
between economy and polity. There can be no doubt that the need for conflict resolution 
is much greater than ever before. But the task has become more difficult. And the effort is 
much less.” (Nayyar 1998: 3129)  
Conclusion 
The import-substituting industrialization centred economic growth process after India‟s 
independence was characterized by an uneven development. The degrees of structural change 
and social progress it brought about were limited by some crucial weaknesses which the state 
was unable to overcome. Yet it produced a not so visible transformation of Indian big business 
and its context as to make it ready to accept and even desire a greater degree of integration with 
the global economy and removal of other kinds of state control it had originally accepted as 
necessary. This set the stage for a durable transition to liberalization with the consequences of 
the shift being an intensification of the process of uneven development. One side of that uneven 
development created a powerful constituency aggressively favouring liberalization. This 
included Indian big business, which has experienced exceptional growth and driven the process 
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of India‟s „emergence‟, and a segment of the middle class.  At the same time, the very logic of 
the liberalization process increased the leverage of private capital with the state. Capitalist 
priorities have thus pressed down even harder on an already constrained state which had always 
exhibited a weakness in its capacity to discipline private capital. State support, now in new 
ways, was important for the success of an Indian capital under globalization. The result, 
however, has been that the Indian state has become more exclusive in its outlook and 
unresponsive to any pressures emanating from the other side of uneven development whereby 
the large majority of the populace is caught in a low-income trap. The growth process 
characterized by highly concentrated increases in income, constraints on public investment and 
economic openness has been unable to create the conditions for sustained industrial expansion. 
Instead this growth has maintained itself, aided by the low-wage context, by assuming a pattern 
dominated by the expansion of services and construction activities. This trajectory is showing 
signs of being under strain but not any indicating any impending change of course.    
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